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1.
Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason has focused intensively
on the transcendental deduction of the categories – the pivotal chapter
of the book that governs our understanding of much that precedes it
and just about all that follows it. One simple way to understand the
systematic function of the Transcendental Deduction is to appreciate
that it provides an account of how the ‘two stems of human knowledge’
(A15/B29) – sensibility and understanding – must relate to one another
in the production of knowledge.1 On Kant’s view, these capacities are
distinguished by their radically different modes of representation:
intuition and concept. Although sensibility and understanding are
fundamentally distinct – they ‘cannot exchange their functions’ – they
must nevertheless cooperate in the production of knowledge: ‘Only
through their unification can cognition arise’ (A51/B75–6). The task of
the Deduction is to show how the categories – concepts that stem from
the ‘nature of the understanding’ alone – apply necessarily to objects
that can only be given in experience, and represented as given through
sensible intuition.2
Yet my concern in this paper lies not with the details of the tran-
scendental deduction of the categories, but rather with Kant’s remarks
about a transcendental deduction of ‘the concepts of space and time’. In
the preamble to the transcendental deduction of the categories, Kant
announces:
We have above traced the concepts of space and time to their sources by
means of a transcendental deduction, and explained and determined their a
priori objective validity. (§13, A87/B119–120)
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What is this transcendental deduction, and what is its relation to the
more widely examined transcendental deduction of the categories?3
Kant’s remark startles: the designation of this transcendental deduction
occurs ex post facto. We may safely infer that Kant here points back to
the Transcendental Aesthetic, as there is simply no other prior part of
the book that could conceivably contain a transcendental deduction of
the concepts of space and time.
Otherwise, Kant’s stunner leaves only a tangle of questions in its
wake. Is this transcendental deduction carried out in one distinct part of
the Aesthetic, or is it the upshot of the Aesthetic in its entirety? Com-
mentators have offered a variety of inconclusive answers to this question
– to the extent that they have addressed the issue at all.4 And why does
Kant refer here to the concepts of space and time, when the Aesthetic is
supposed to have established that space and time are pure intuitions?
And what, exactly, is a transcendental deduction of the concepts of
space and time? Is it strictly analogous to the transcendental deduction
of the categories, or are there instead significant differences?5
The only interpretative guidance Kant offers lies in the suggestion
that this transcendental deduction would have addressed the ‘a priori
objective validity’ of space and time. This bit of guidance, however, only
sharpens our view of the interpretative challenges at stake. For there is
good reason to doubt that Transcendental Aesthetic should possess the
philosophical resources to yield claims about the objective validity of
our representations. Later remarks in the Transcendental Deduction give
rise to such doubt, at any rate. There Kant claims that ‘the unity of con-
sciousness is that which alone constitutes the relation of representations
to an object, [and] hence their objective validity; and consequently that
they become cognitions’ (§19, B137). Kant accounts for the ‘unity of
consciousness’ through the identification of a principle – the principle
of the synthetic unity of apperception – which is first revealed in §16 of
the Deduction. Therefore, if the transcendental deduction of a concept
is the account of its a priori objective validity, how could there have been
a transcendental deduction of the concepts of space and time before
having the principle of the synthetic unity of apperception in hand?
Given its primary position in the order of exposition, it does not seem
that the Transcendental Aesthetic can establish anything about the objec-
tive validity of the concepts of space and time. Perhaps this business
about their transcendental deduction of space and time is nothing more
than a slip of the pen.
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However, I do not think that Kant’s pen has slipped there – and, at
any rate, basic principles of exegesis require us to see if the apparently
conflicting claims might be brought into stable equilibrium. The conflict
at issue concerns the philosophical resources of the Aesthetic: whether
they are sufficient to yield claims about the objective validity of our
representations. Such assessment of the philosophical resources of the
Aesthetic is a prerequisite for arriving at an adequate understanding of
the systematic relation between the Aesthetic and the Deduction – how,
that is, the Deduction may draw upon the results of the Aesthetic. Does
the Deduction’s account of the objective validity of the categories
depend upon the Aesthetic’s account of the objective validity of space
and time? Or is it the case that nothing can be established about the
objective validity of space and time prior to the transcendental deduc-
tion of the categories? And if we take the latter position, how are we
to interpret Kant’s remarks about a transcendental deduction of the
concepts of space and time?
My aim in this paper is to explain Kant’s retrospective remark about
a transcendental deduction of space and time, and hence to address the
sense in which the Aesthetic can provide an account of their objective
validity. My account shall proceed from two interpretative pre-
suppositions. The first concerns the notion of ‘objective validity’ itself.
I take it that the notion of objective validity applies properly to concepts:
to establish that a concept is objectively valid is to account for its applic-
ability to some real (empirical) object, and hence for its figuring in
our knowledge of such objects. If the notion of ‘validity’ tracks the
legitimacy of our applying certain representations, then this notion
should pertain to concepts but not intuitions, since the latter are actual-
izations of our receptivity and thus are not happily thought of as being
applied. Hence it will be important, in what follows, to distinguish
between the concepts of space and time and the intuitions of space and
time.
My second presupposition has more to do with general interpretative
methodology. I have raised a question about the philosophical resources
of the Aesthetic – whether they are sufficient to yield claims about the
objective validity of our representations, and specifically the concepts of
space and time. It is the transcendental deduction of the categories that
teaches us that this might be an issue at all.6 Nevertheless, this question
about the philosophical resources of the Aesthetic requires us to
examine the Aesthetic on its own terms, fully appreciating its primary
place in the order of exposition.7 In this paper, I wish to consider what
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argumentative resources are both available in the Aesthetic, and actually
employed there. As I will suggest later on, my resolute adoption of this
interpretative principle distinguishes my account from that of other
commentators.
2.
In order to provide any account of the significance of the Aesthetic’s
transcendental deduction, we must examine the Aesthetic in some detail
– though an exhaustive reading lies outside of the scope of this paper.
My aim is to shed light on the nature of its arguments in order to
explain, ultimately, just what a transcendental deduction of space and
time is supposed to achieve, and how the Aesthetic manages to achieve
it. I shall begin in this section (§2) with the Aesthetic’s opening remarks
regarding a hylomorphic distinction to be drawn with regard to
intuition. This will help us to ascertain the general aim of the Aesthetic,
which will in turn provide general interpretative guidance for the rest of
the account. The bulk of my account (§§3–5) shall address the fact that
the primary task of the Aesthetic is to provide an ‘exposition’ of the
concepts of space and time. Clarification of just what sort of account
an ‘exposition’ is meant to provide will then enable us to locate the
transcendental deduction precisely in the text of the Aesthetic, as well as
to appreciate what this deduction achieves and why it is required
(§§6–7).
The aim of the Aesthetic can be drawn out of Kant’s initial proposal
to distinguish between the ‘matter’ and ‘form’ of appearances:
In appearance I call that which corresponds to the sensation its matter, but I
call that which makes it that the manifold of appearance can be ordered in
certain relations the form of appearance. Since that in which alone sensations
can be ordered, and placed in a certain form, cannot itself in turn be
sensation, so the matter of all appearance is only given to us a posteriori, but
its form must all lie ready for it in the mind a priori, and can therefore be
regarded separately from all sensation. (A20/B34)
Claiming that sensation cannot itself order sensation, and noting that
sensation is of course ‘given to us a posteriori’, Kant baldly asserts that
the form of appearance – its ordering principle – must lie ‘in the mind a
priori’. Is this supposed to be an argument? If so, it fails. For even if we
grant the apparent premise that sensation must be orderable, we are left
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wanting some warrant for the inference from the a posteriori nature of
sensation (matter) to the a priori nature of the form. Nothing has been
said to rule out the possibility of an a posteriori form.
Now, it is possible that Kant does not take himself to be offering an
argument here – I will return to that in a moment. First it is worth
pausing to take note of a further development. The hylomorphism
thesis, as inadequately defended as it is, provides the platform for what
appears to be an announcement of the investigative programme of the
Aesthetic.8 The hylomorphism thesis allows us to suppose that we may
start with a composite representation, and strip away whatever is con-
tributed by the intellect, as well as ‘everything that belongs to sensation,
so that nothing but pure intuition and the mere form of appearances
remains, which is the sole thing that sensibility yields a priori’ (A22/B36;
see also A20–1/B35). Kant speaks in the definite future here: ‘we will’
carry this out ‘in the Aesthetic’ (A22/B36). Yet the simple fact is that this
abstraction procedure is not carried out in the Aesthetic; Kant rather
seems to treat these remarks as if they were a performative speech act,
achieving directly through the uttering. Moreover, it is hard to see how
this abstraction procedure could be carried out in any systematic way at
this point in the book, since we do not yet have in place the official story
about what the understanding contributes to appearances: we could
hardly be expected to know, for the purposes of a ‘science of all a priori
principles of sensibility’ (A21/B35), what is to be removed at each stage.9
Undeterred, Kant continues: ‘It will be found in this investigation, that
there are two pure forms of sensible intuition as principles of a priori
cognition, namely space and time, with the assessment of which we now
occupy ourselves’ (A22/B36). But rather than working through the
abstraction procedure that the hylomorphism thesis seemed, at least
partially, to underwrite, we are instead ushered on to the exposition of
space and time – without any initial justification that these are the
representations with which we ought to be concerned.
These puzzles about what Kant is up to in the Aesthetic – and what
he takes himself to be up to in the Aesthetic – confront us from the start.
I would like to suggest that the hylomorphism thesis has already been
argued for in the Critique’s front matter, though in a preliminary and
provisional fashion.
The front matter is largely concerned with clarifying the operative
conception of the faculty of reason, the subject of critical self-assessment.
The relevant conception of reason is drawn from a view of the meta-
physical impulse that Kant attributes to the ‘peculiar fate’ of human
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reason (Avii): in metaphysics, reason ‘determines its object wholly a
priori’ (Bx). This is taken to be the fundamental claim of reason, which
Critical philosophy aims to vindicate. Specifically at stake is reason’s
capacity for theoretical cognition, in which it merely determines its
object without also making the object actual (Bix).10 In other words, the
objects of theoretical cognition exist independently of the cognition
itself; the cognition of these objects must therefore represent them in
a manner that respects this independence. Hence Kant suggests that
reason would need to incorporate a receptive capacity as one of its
elements: this receptive capacity (sensibility) makes a distinct, and
necessary, contribution to theoretical cognition – and, specifically, to a
priori theoretical cognition.
The vindication of the claim of reason would require that we show
how it could be possible to determine something about these objects
prior to their being actually given – prior, that is, to their being perceived
– but without losing sight of their status as objects that must be able to
be represented as given in order to be known at all. The cognition in
question would require representations that are a priori, and yet are also
actualizations of our receptivity. Thus an a priori receptive capacity
would figure as an element of pure theoretical reason: to suppose other-
wise would close down the project of accounting for our capacity to
make claims that hold of necessity and yet pertain to matters of fact (i.e.
to judge synthetically and a priori). The front matter then concludes by
pointing to the distinct task of a transcendental aesthetic: the account of
the representations that would ‘constitute the condition under which
objects are given to us’ (A15/B29–30). In this manner, the front matter
concludes with what Kant refers to as a ‘preliminary’ that professes only
to point out what would need to be established about human sensibility
if the claim of reason were to be vindicated.
The opening section of the Aesthetic – with its perfunctory account
of hylomorphism – may, in turn, be interpreted as simply refining our
view of what would need to be established in a transcendental doctrine
of sense. After all, it is puzzling on the face of it: how can there be a
priori sensible representations, given that sensible representation would
seem to require that the mind is somehow affected? Hylomorphism is
introduced as a possible key to the solution: the matter of sensible
representation is whatever corresponds to the physical affection, but the
form is the condition of the possibility of our sensible consciousness
of the matter. The hylomorphism thesis is anchored in Kant’s initial
presentation of the claim of reason: it clarifies something about the
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overall framework of the critical investigation – the investigation that
aims to vindicate the claim of reason. The hylomorphism thesis does not
require a knock-down argument at the outset of the Aesthetic; it may be
admitted as a proposal on the ground that the critical investigation
could not get underway without it.
But we have to be careful how we interpret the hylomorphism thesis.
One might suppose that the hylomorphism thesis simply draws on the
intuitive point that, for example, no sound could register in our con-
sciousness if it had no duration in time, and no colour could register in
our consciousness if it had no extension in space. The representations of
space and time seem to be required in order for the matter of sensation
to show up for us at all; hence ‘the matter of all appearance’ depends
upon a form that would ‘lie ready for it in the mind a priori’ (A20/B34).
This way of interpreting the hylomorphism turns on a claim about the
role of pure forms of intuition in the conscious enjoyment of sensation.
However, it does not seem to possess the resources to address the role
that these forms might play in allowing sensation to figure in knowledge
of objects. It does not, for example, distinguish between the case of my
seeing a spatially extended white page before me, and my enjoying the
extension of a rhapsodic blotch of colour upon closing my eyes.
Since the hylomorphism thesis is anchored in Kant’s presentation of
the Critical project as one that promises to vindicate the claim of reason,
we must interpret that thesis in a manner that is consonant with that
aim. Kant promises that the Aesthetic will show that there are ‘two pure
forms of sensible intuition as principles of a priori cognition, namely
space and time’ (A22/B36, emphasis added). So when we admit the hylo-
morphism thesis on the ground that it simply clarifies something about
the general framework of the Critical project, it is already thereby sup-
posed that these ‘pure forms of sensible intuition’ would play a neces-
sary role in the cognition of objects. We cannot yet say that there really
are such forms; we cannot even say what it would really mean for there
to be such forms. But we might get some handle on the idea by noting
that, for example, the apparent spatiality of our rhapsodic blotch is not
intersubjectively accessible. By contrast, when we think of a represen-
tation’s playing a necessary role in the cognition of objects, what matters
is that representation’s capacity to put us on to intersubjectively
accessible features of things. Space, as a pure form, must be like that.
At this point in the Aesthetic, no positive steps have been taken
toward an account of the relevant notion of a ‘pure form of sensible
intuition’. So far, we can only say that the required account of these pure
KANT ON THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF SPACE AND TIME
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forms should establish their status as necessary conditions of the cog-
nition of objects. Thus, when the Aesthetic claims to offer an account of
the a priori constitution of human sensibility – the ‘constant form’ of
our receptivity (A27/B43) – this must be interpreted so that the pure
forms of intuition should be accounted for as sources of cognition. I
now set out to show how the Aesthetic can offer such an account.
Clarification of this (broadly methodological) issue will prepare us to
account for the transcendental deduction of space and time at the end.
3.
After the introduction of the hylomorphism thesis, Kant moves abruptly
to the ‘expositions’ of the concepts of space and time. It will be helpful
first to appreciate the general structure of the Aesthetic, which I repre-
sent in the following table; the section headings listed are Kant’s own,
except what appears in brackets.
In this section, I will consider what ‘exposition’ involves, according to
Kant. In subsequent sections (§§4–5), I will address the distinct but
complementary functions of the Metaphysical and Transcendental
Expositions,11 in preparation for addressing our question about what the
Aesthetic can establish regarding the objective validity of space and time
(§§6–7).
Let me begin with this overview, which looks ahead to the rest of my
account. As we can see from the table above, the expositions concern the
concepts of space and time. This is the case even though the Aesthetic
Table 1: Organization of the Transcendental Aesthetic
§2: Metaphysical Exposition of
this Concept [i.e. space]
§3: Transcendental Exposition
of the Concept of Space
[unnumbered section of
commentary on the exposition
of space, A26–30/B42–45]
§4: Metaphysical Exposition of
the Concept of Time
§5: Transcendental Exposition
of the Concept of Time
§6: [section of commentary on
the exposition of time]
§§7–8: [general commentary on the expositions of space and time]
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aims to show that space and time are intuitions. Many commentators
have simply supposed that Kant must be using the term ‘concept’ in
some broader sense, to refer to ‘representation’ in general.12 Recently,
Lorne Falkenstein, has argued that the point of the expositions is to
show that the concepts of space and time refer to intuitions of space and
time.13 I endorse his overarching interpretative suggestion wholeheart-
edly; however, since I disagree on many further matters of interpretation,
I will provide my own argument, in the following sections, for the claim
that the Metaphysical and Transcendental Expositions together show
that the concepts of space and time refer to pure intuitions of space and
time.14 Once that account is in place, we will see how a claim about the
objective validity of the concepts of space and time follows as a direct
consequence of the expositions.
In labeling the central stretch of the Aesthetic ‘exposition’, Kant
indicates that its task is to present the content of the concepts of space
and time:
By exposition (expositio) I understand the clear (even if not the complete)
representation of that which belongs to a concept; an exposition is meta-
physical if it contains that which exhibits the concept as given a priori.
(A23/B38)
While exposition per se presents the content of a concept, metaphysical
exposition presents the content of concepts that are ‘given a priori’.15
Since we are concerned here with the argumentative strategies of the
Aesthetic, it is worth mentioning that exposition differs from definition.
According to Kant, there can be no analytic definitions of given con-
cepts, since there is no way to establish that an exhaustive account of the
content has been provided (Logic §104, 9:142). This point is reiterated in
theCritique’s Doctrine of Method, at least with respect to concepts that
are ‘given a priori’ such as ‘substance, cause, right, equity’: ‘strictly
speaking’, they cannot be defined (A728/B756).16 For this reason, Kant
continues, the term ‘exposition [Exposition]’ should be preferred to the
overly strong ‘definition’: the exposition of a concept can be admitted as
‘valid to a certain degree’ even if it does not provide an exhaustive
treatment of the content of a concept (A729/B757).17
The main work of the Aesthetic is divided into Metaphysical and
Transcendental Expositions. The Metaphysical Exposition, I will argue,
presents an analytic exposition of the concepts of space and time.
Concept analysis, I take it, proceeds by our reflecting upon the usage of
KANT ON THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF SPACE AND TIME
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a concept in a conceptual scheme. So, for example, the content of the
concept of a certain theoretical entity may be exposited by considering
its place, and corresponding entailment relations, in the scientific model
in which it figures. I choose this non-ordinary example in order to
emphasize that concept analysis does not, by itself, show that the con-
cept refers to something that really exists: the concept may turn out to
have nothing real corresponding to it at all.18
I will argue that the two stages of the exposition of the concepts of
space and time address these issues in turn. That is, the Metaphysical
Expositions explain what is thought in the concepts of space and time,
by reflecting upon certain facts about our usage. They reveal that our
usage reflects our commitment to the idea that the concepts of space and
time refer to pure intuitions of space and time. However, the Meta-
physical Expositions do not establish the legitimacy of these concepts:
our commitment to the idea that space and time are pure intuitions
could be unfounded. The Transcendental Expositions, then, show that
the concepts of space and time – as presented in the Metaphysical
Expositions – do indeed refer to something real, something that actually
exists. However, this conclusion must be handled with care. For the
concepts of space and time do not refer to objects in any ordinary sense,
but rather to intuitions lying ‘in the mind a priori’ (A20/B34); and so,
as we will see, the account of their objective validity (and hence their
‘transcendental deduction’) must fully acknowledge this point.
Before going on to examine the Metaphysical and Transcendental
Expositions in any detail, I would like to indicate some of the ways in
which my approach differs from that of other commentators. One point
of difference is that my account takes more seriously than most Kant’s
presentation of the central task of the Aesthetic as ‘exposition’ –
the ‘representation of that which belongs to a concept’. In my précis
above, I noted that the Metaphysical Exposition provides an analytic
exposition, which is to say that its central task is concept analysis. But
then a further question naturally arises regarding the status of the
Transcendental Exposition: in what sense does it continue the project of
exposition, defined by Kant as representing what ‘belongs to a concept’?
On my view, the Transcendental Exposition does continue the project of
showing what ‘belongs’ to the concept in question; but its claim is not
an analytic one, drawn merely from reflection upon facts about our
usage.19 At this point, I can only flag the issue, which I will explore when
the discussion turns to the Transcendental Exposition (§5).
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Another point of difference between my account and that of many
other commentators stems from my resolution to interpret the Aesthetic
in a manner that is consonant with its primary place in the Critique’s
order of exposition. My intention is to acknowledge fully what is actually
there on the page in the Aesthetic, and to avoid the temptation to supply
supporting arguments that draw from developments that occur only
later in the Critique.20 As we will see, Kant’s remarks in the Meta-
physical Exposition are terse in the extreme. This has led commentators
to supply the arguments that they suppose are standing behind the
scenes.
What these supplied arguments are supposed to achieve will of course
depend upon the particular commentator’s view of the argumentative
burden of the Metaphysical Expositions: while many take this burden to
be establishing the objective validity of space and time, more recently
Daniel Warren has argued that this burden is only to establish the a
priori origin of space and time. So, Warren takes each numbered para-
graph of the Metaphysical Exposition of space to provide an ‘apriority
argument’: each shows that the representation of spatial relations
depends upon, and hence has its origin in, the representation of space
itself. He then focuses entirely on what he refers to as the ‘first a priority
argument’ (the first numbered paragraph), supplying the missing argu-
ment.21
With Warren, I agree that it is not the task of the Metaphysical
Exposition to establish the objective validity of space and time; as I will
argue, this is established only in the sections of commentary that follow
the expositions. And as long as the argumentative burden of the Meta-
physical Expositions is correctly appreciated, there can be no harm in
commentators’ supplying the arguments that Kant might have failed
to provide: Warren’s account of the first apriority argument can be
accepted as an argument for an important feature of our concept of
space.22 Yet whatever arguments commentators may supply to occupy
the silences of the Metaphysical Exposition, they can do nothing more
than account for the content of our concepts of space and time. They
cannot establish the legitimacy of these concepts. So, in saying this, I am
simply pointing out that I am asking a broader question from the one
that Warren considers. And given that Kant takes the Aesthetic to
establish sensibility’s status as a cognitive capacity, I might add that this
other question – about the legitimacy of our concepts of space and time,
and their objective validity – is paramount.23
KANT ON THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF SPACE AND TIME
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4.
Having taken note of what Kant understands by ‘exposition’, we
anticipate an analysis of the concepts of space and time in the Aesthetic.
(To avoid repetition and to keep my remarks to a manageable length, I
will consider only space.) In concept analysis, we typically consider how
we use the concept in question. One relevant feature of our usage is that
we say that we represent things in space. The task of the Exposition is
to clarify what this and other facts about our usage reveal about the
content of the concept of space. The Metaphysical Exposition divides
into four numbered paragraphs, which I will refer to as ‘moments’ of the
exposition.
In the first moment, Kant sets out with the denial that space is ‘an
empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences’ (A23/
B38). The claim appears to be based on the following remark:
For in order for certain impressions to be related to something outside of me
(i.e. to something in another region of space from that in which I find
myself), and, by the same token, in order for me to represent them as outside
and next to one another, thus not merely as different but as in different
places, the representation of space must already lie at the basis of this.
(A23/B38)
Here Kant talks about representing things in various regions of space, as
well as attributing to things certain relational spatial predicates. He
claims that the representation of space itself ‘lies at the basis’ of these
ways of representing.
Although Kant does begin with a negative claim about how the
representation of space arises – inasmuch as it is not an empirical con-
cept, it would not arise through abstraction upon particular ‘outer
experiences’ – Kant does not seem to have offered a positive, apodictic
argument for the a priori origin of the representation of space. Contrary
to many commentators, I do not suppose that Kant even intends for the
first moment to provide such an argument: at the very least, there is no
demonstration there on the page. What we find instead better fits my
interpretation, which is that Kant simply means to reflect broadly upon
our usage of the concept of space – a task that will occupy him
throughout the Metaphysical Exposition.24
If it makes sense to speak of a concept of space, then it should in turn
make sense to speak of particular spaces, or places, that are appreciated
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as such in light of the general concept of space. There is something that
it is to be a space; we can say that we are sitting in a particular space,
and that we will get up and walk down the hall and find ourselves in a
different space or place. A crucial fact about our usage of the concept of
space is the following: when we take something to be a space, or when
we take something to have certain spatial properties, we ipso facto take
it to be in space. Now, the sort of determination that I make when
I recognize that I am now in a different space from where I was ten
minutes ago, or when I say that a certain bar of chocolate lies alongside
my cup of tea, involves experience. In the first moment, Kant suggests
that such determinations make a necessary reference to the representa-
tion of space itself, claiming that ‘the representation of space must
already lie at the basis’ of such determinations.
Why should we suppose that the determination of particular spaces,
or of particular spatial relations, requires the representation of space
itself? This question is not fully answered in the first moment; the answer
emerges gradually in the course of the Metaphysical Exposition. We
do not yet have a very clear view of this requirement, or relation of
dependence. The conclusion of the first moment – if we can so dignify
it – is vague and gestural at best. Kant has offered nothing more than a
reflection upon our usage, suggesting our commitment to the idea that
the representation of space is prior – in some way that remains to be
clarified – to the representation of particular spaces and the attribution
of spatial properties and relations.
The second moment invokes the same vague idea that the repre-
sentation of space ‘lies at the basis’ of the representation of particular
spaces and the attribution of spatial properties and relations: space is ‘a
necessary a priori representation that lies at the basis of all outer
intuitions’ (A24/B38). There is not a new thought here; just a clarifi-
cation that we take this relation of dependence – outer intuition’s
dependence upon the representation of space itself – to indicate that the
representation of space is a priori. In support, Kant offers only the
following: ‘One can never have a representation of there being no space,
even though one can very well think of there being no objects encoun-
tered in it’ (A24/B38–9). We can consider a variety of objects represented
as being in space, and remove them one by one; we would be left, Kant
maintains, with the representation of space only now devoid of objects
or outer appearances.
The second moment seems to be especially stipulative: there is no
argument there on the page, only the assertion that we cannot represent
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the absence of space. This would be devastating if Kant were to take
himself to establish here, in full certainty, that space is ‘a necessary a
priori representation’. However, on my reading the ambition of each
moment in the Metaphysical Exposition is rather more modest: each
moment simply aims to direct attention to some aspect of the content of
the concept of space. What is said about the content of the concept of
space must, of course, be made plausible; for as we noted above, Kant
claims that the exposition of a concept must be admitted as ‘valid to a
certain degree’ (A729/B757). But analytic exposition of a concept can do
no more than reflect upon facts about usage in order to reveal what we
are committed to in employing the concept as we do. Let us consider the
rest of the Metaphysical Exposition to see if this interpretative sug-
gestion holds up.
Throughout the Metaphysical Exposition, a basic fact about our
usage of the concept of space is continually under consideration: that
we speak of representing things in space. We think of particular spaces
as being in space. Are such particular spaces parts of space? If so, are
they constituent parts, or parts in some other sense? The third moment
takes up these issues:
For, first, one can represent only one space, and if one speaks of many spaces,
one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space. Also,
these parts cannot precede the one all-encompassing space, as its constituent
parts (from which its composition would be possible), but rather they are
only thought in it. (A25/B39)
When we represent a particular space, or a collection of particular
spaces, we represent those spaces as in space; but these spaces do not
‘precede the one all-encompassing space’. Does the third moment shed
fresh light on the basic fact about our usage of the concept of space?
Does it provide clarification of the still vague claim that the repre-
sentation of space itself is prior to the representation of particular
spaces, and the attribution of spatial predicates? Kant does at least
refine our view of the basic fact about our usage: when we say we repre-
sent things in space, we mean that we represent things in ‘the one all-
encompassing space’.
In order to appreciate the significance of this, let us return to the
example of rhapsodic blotches of colour – the sort of thing one might
see upon closing one’s eyes. Certain spatial predicates may seem to apply
to these blotches: one of these blotches can be bigger than another, or to
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the left of another, or alongside another, and so on. Although such
spatial properties seem to apply to the rhapsodic blotches, still we
cannot say that the blotches are in space: for they cannot be related to
something in another region of space from the one that I am in. This is
because they are not located in any determinate space at all. One
rhapsodic blotch may stand in a certain relative ‘distance’ to another
rhapsodic blotch, but it does not stand in any determinate distance to
the tree outside my window. Outer intuitions are represented as being in
space, rather than as merely having certain spatial (or quasi-spatial)
properties.25 And the representation of space itself is importantly
different from these predicates – different in some way that is yet under-
determined, but that has something to do with meeting the requirements
of cognition.
When we employ ‘the universal concept of space in general’ (A25/
B39), we are dealing with a general representation that may determine
particulars. Hence we speak of various places or spaces; when we say of
some particular that it is a space, we see it as being a thing of a certain
kind, a determination governed by the universal concept of space.
However, we do not suppose there to be spaceless ‘gaps’ in between these
particulars, these spaces – distinguishing them from one another, but
without the representation of intervening space. Rather, we take the
various spaces to be parts of ‘the one all-encompassing space’. Thus, not
only does the representation of the various spaces depend upon the
representation of space as that representation which these various spaces
are in, but the representation of space is the representation of a unique
particular. On this basis, Kant concludes that we take space to be ‘a pure
intuition’ (A25/B39), a singular representation. This suggests, in turn,
that the universal concept of space refers to a pure intuition: ‘as far as
space is concerned, an a priori intuition . . . lies at the basis of all con-
cepts of space’ (A25/B39).
In the fourth moment Kant continues his reflection on the basic fact
about our usage – i.e. that we say we represent things in space. Since
space is a pure intuition, it is a singular representation; and this, in light
of the basic fact about our usage, suggests that space is a representation
that contains other representations. But in what sense does space con-
tain other representations? Is it importantly different from the way in
which a concept may contain representations? This is Kant’s concern
in the fourth moment, where he distinguishes two ways in which a
representation could contain other representations: ‘under itself ’ versus
‘within itself ’.
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Now, it is true that one must think of every concept as a representation that
is contained in an infinite multitude of different possible representations (as
their common mark [Merkmal]), thus [a concept] contains these under itself.
But no concept, as such, can be thought of as containing an infinite multitude
of representations within itself. Yet this is how space is thought . . . (B40)
Here Kant invokes a contrast between the way that concepts represent as
opposed to the way that intuitions represent. A concept contains
representations ‘under’ it. Concepts, in other words, are representations
that govern other representations (‘subsuming’ them).26 What does a
concept govern? It governs the representation of the particulars to which
it applies. Judging that x is an F is a way of representing x; the concept
F is the ‘common mark’ that infinitely many such judgements – repre-
sentations – could share.27 In this sense, a concept is potentially con-
tained in infinitely many representations, inasmuch as it may subsume
infinitely many representations under itself. The intuition of space,
however, does not contain representations under itself at all: intuition is
a singular mode of representation, and hence is not happily thought of
as applying to – subsuming, or governing our understanding of – other
representations.
So far, we have just considered what it means to say that a concept
contains representations ‘under’ it, and we have noted that there is no
problem with the idea that a concept may contain infinitely many repre-
sentations ‘under itself’. Although the fourth moment seems to turn
upon our granting that a concept cannot contain infinitely many
representations ‘within itself’,28 the crucial point is arguably this: while
concepts and intuitions may both contain representations ‘within’
themselves, they do so in different ways. In the third moment, Kant
noted that while we can think of various spaces as parts of space, we do
not think of them as constituent parts of space – parts out of which
space is, as it were, built. A concept, however, does contain represen-
tations within itself in something like this sense. The concept human
does not subsume the concept mammal; it contains the concept within
itself, as part of its content. What are the representations that a concept
contains ‘within’ itself? The constituent concepts of its intension.
Throughout the Metaphysical Exposition, Kant repeatedly claims
that the representation of space ‘lies at the basis’ of other represen-
tations: it ‘lies at the basis’ of the determination of particular spaces and
the attribution of spatial predicates (first and second moments), and it
‘lies at the basis’ of any concept of space (third and fourth moments).
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Does this mean that the concept of space is derived from the pure
intuition of space? Perhaps; but Kant cannot intend to tell a story about
how we arrive at the concept of space from the pure intuition – at least
not in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Such an issue is cut from the same
cloth as Kant’s difficult claim that the categories are not innate, but
rather are ‘originally acquired’. The account of how we acquire the
concept of space would draw from explanatory resources that become
available only later, in the Transcendental Deduction.29 Nevertheless, the
Transcendental Aesthetic’s analytic exposition of the concept of space
should have the resources to show that we take the concept of space to
refer to – and presumably also derive from – a pure intuition. Hence the
final claim of the Metaphysical Exposition, at the close of the fourth
moment: ‘the original representation of space is a priori intuition’ (B40).
I have presented the Metaphysical Exposition as an analytic exposi-
tion of the concept of space. We can refine and clarify our view of the
Metaphysical Exposition if we pause to consider both how the concept
of space is peculiar, as well as how the concept of space is just like any
other concept. This should help us to avoid confusion about what the
Metaphysical Exposition has revealed about the concept of space.
On my interpretation, this exposition is supposed to show that the
concept of space refers to a pure intuition. Indeed, it is supposed to show
that the concept of space refers to a unique particular: i.e. ‘the one all-
encompassing space’ (A25/B39). We might think that this result
challenges the very idea of there being a concept of space at all: if con-
cepts are general representations, how can there be a concept that refers
to a unique particular? We can begin to address this by noting how the
concept of space is a concept like any other: the content of a concept is
articulated through its constituent concepts or intension. The concept of
space presumably contains in its intension the concept representation,
the concept intuition, the concept of the a priori, and so on. These
constituent concepts determine that to which the concept of space may
apply. However, it simply turns out that there is just one thing that meets
all of the relevant criteria: space as pure intuition.
Saying this, however, brings a fresh difficulty to the fore. Earlier, I
claimed that if it makes sense to say that there is a concept of space at
all, then it should also make sense to say that particular spaces are
appreciated as such through that concept: i.e. to recognize something as
a particular space is to subsume it under the concept of space. How
does this square with the Metaphysical Exposition’s claim that the
concept of space refers to a unique particular? If there is only ‘the one
KANT ON THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF SPACE AND TIME
KANTIAN REVIEW, VOLUME 14-2, 2010 17
Kantian 14-2 pages:Master Testpages KR  4/1/10  12:54  Page 17
all-encompassing space’, perhaps it simply does not make sense to speak
of particular spaces at all.
Here we must acknowledge a further peculiarity of the concept of
space. The concept of space does not govern our understanding of par-
ticular spaces in quite the same way that the concept cup might govern
our understanding of particular cups, or even as the concept virtue
might govern our understanding of the concept of bravery. The repre-
sentation of particular spaces, as Kant notes, ‘rests solely on limitations’
of the ‘one all-encompassing space’ (A25/B39). The concept of space
refers to a unique particular: the pure intuition of space is a unique
particular. Yet – and here I am simply reframing the previous point for
emphasis – this unique particular is itself a representation. Moreover,
this representation can admit infinitely many ‘limitations’ within it;
indeed, the representation of particular spaces depends upon the intro-
duction of such limitations into the representation of space. What this
means, then, is that space must be understood to be a certain capacity
for representing; it is a mode of representing. This may be acknowledged
without losing sight of the idea that the concept of space refers to a
unique particular. For there are properties of this unique particular.
(Geometry provides the scientific account of its properties.) The prop-
erties of space, of this unique particular, are properties of an intuitional
capacity for representing. Therefore, the referent of the concept of space
is all of the following: a pure intuition, a unique particular, and a mode
of representing.30
I have argued that the Metaphysical Expositions offer an analysis of
the concept of space. I have taken this approach because it more faith-
fully acknowledges the rather gestural character of the text: the Meta-
physical Exposition reads more like a collection of related assertions
than it does like an argument (or set of arguments) that might apodic-
tically demonstrate that space is an a priori intuition. How does this fare
in the face of Kant’s claim that the Aesthetic must ‘not merely earn favor
as a plausible hypothesis’ but rather must ‘be as certain and indubitable
as can ever be demanded of a theory that may serve as an organon’
(A46/B63)? Does it accord with the Aesthetic’s aspiration to be a ‘science
of all a priori principles of sensibility’ (A21/B35)? A science, by Kant’s
lights, is supposed to provide demonstrations establishing conclusions
that we can be certain about. It does not seem that the Metaphysical
Exposition has established any apodictic conclusions at all.
Neither the Metaphysical Exposition itself, nor the embellished
version of the Metaphysical Exposition supplied by some commentators,
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can address what is arguably the crucial issue: namely whether these
concepts refer to anything at all. I suggest that this is the crucial issue
because the overarching aim of the Aesthetic is, after all, to establish that
sensibility is a cognitive capacity. And in order to achieve this goal, it will
be necessary first to show that there really are pure intuitions of space
and time to which these concepts refer. Then it will be necessary to show
that these pure intuitions play a necessary role in the cognition of
objects. These issues are not addressed in the Metaphysical Expositions.
The first issue is addressed in the Transcendental Expositions, and
the second is addressed through the transcendental deduction of the
concepts of space and time, which is presented in the sections of com-
mentary that follow the Expositions. Only then do we have what could
arguably be admitted as an apodictic result.
Thus, the Metaphysical Expositions have left us expecting, or hoping,
that the Transcendental Exposition will show that space must be as the
Metaphysical Exposition presented it. Let us now turn to the Transcen-
dental Exposition to see if these expectations are met.
5.
As I suggested before, we can distinguish the task of concept analysis, as
the presentation of what is thought in a given concept, from the
demonstration that the concept in question refers to something real. We
might, in typical contexts, think of the latter task as establishing the
‘objective validity’ of the concept.
But the case of the concepts of space and time is not typical. What we
find in the Aesthetic is first, an account of the legitimacy of these
concepts (in the Transcendental Exposition), followed by an account of
their objective validity (in their ‘transcendental deduction’).31 So, when
we present the concepts of space and time in the Metaphysical Exposi-
tions, we find that we take these concepts to refer to pure intuitions: this
is reflected in our usage of these concepts. But we still face a question
about whether these concepts refer to something that really exists: our
usage of these concepts reflects a commitment to the idea that space and
time are pure intuitions, but is that commitment legitimate? After all,
our concepts of space and time could be fraudulent or confused –
expressing our commitment to something that is not real in any way at
all. The Transcendental Expositions show that the concepts of space
and time are not fraudulent, because they have a real referent (namely,
space and time as pure intuitions).
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Of course, the claim that the concepts of space and time refer to
something ‘real’ needs special handling, since (e.g.) the concept of space
is importantly different from the concept of a theoretical entity, and also
from a concept like chair. While the account of the legitimacy of a
concept involves an account of the reality of its referent, the reality of
the pure intuitions of space and time needs to be understood within the
general context of transcendental idealism, as Kant explains in the
sections of commentary that follow the Expositions. It is only in these
sections of commentary that we find Kant’s account of the objective
validity of the concepts of space and time; there we find the transcen-
dental deduction of these concepts – an account of how they apply, with
necessity and universality, to objects of our cognition.
For now, let us focus our attention on the Transcendental Exposi-
tions. A transcendental exposition, Kant explains, is
the explanation of a concept, as a principle from which the possibility of
other synthetic a priori cognition can be understood. To this end it is required
1) that the cognitions really do flow from the given concept, 2) that these
cognitions are only possible under the presupposition of a given way of
explaining this concept. (B40)
In overview, the Transcendental Exposition of space proceeds as follows.
Kant begins by invoking geometry’s status as a ‘science’ that ‘determines
the properties of space synthetically and yet a priori’ (B40). Geometry is
concerned with the properties of space; this knowledge is not derived
analytically from mere concepts, but rather through the practice of
reasoning with diagrams (the construction of concepts). Hence even
though we speak of a concept of space, ‘[s]pace must originally be
intuition’ (B40). Moreover, since geometry yields only apodictic claims,
Kant maintains that space must be ‘pure, not empirical, intuition’ (B41).
On my reading, the argumentative burden of the Transcendental
Exposition is to show that the concept of space – as unpacked in the
Metaphysical Exposition – refers to something that really exists, namely
space as a pure intuition. Let me begin by defending this general view
of the Transcendental Exposition’s task. For it might seem that my
interpretation fails to give due weight to the fact that the Transcendental
Exposition is, after all, an exposition – which, as we have seen, means
that it should present the content of a concept (A23/B38). How does
showing that space exists as pure intuition continue the project of
expositing the content of the concept of space?
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The Metaphysical Exposition reveals our commitment to the idea
that the concept of space refers to a pure intuition; and, as I reflected on
this result above (in §4), this means in turn that the concept of space
refers to something in our subjective makeup, a mode of representing.
The Transcendental Exposition shows that there really is such an aspect
of our subjective makeup. In arriving at this result, the Transcendental
Exposition appeals to the existence of geometry: we admit as given that
we legitimately make cognitive claims of a certain sort (we determine
‘the properties of space synthetically and yet a priori’, B40). Space, as
pure intuition, is the object of such cognition. With geometry presup-
posed – at least as a science of space, if not yet as a science of nature32
– it follows that space, as pure intuition, really exists. In this way, the
Transcendental Exposition reveals something new about what belongs
to the concept of space: namely that the pure intuition to which this
concept refers is a source of synthetic a priori cognition. While the Meta-
physical Exposition is an analytic exposition (unpacking the content of
the concept of space), the Transcendental Exposition is a synthetic ex-
position: it contributes to the presentation of the content of the concept
of space, but it does so ‘synthetically’ by making an existence claim.33
We will gain a clearer understanding of this last point, and better
appreciate both the argument and result of the Transcendental Exposi-
tion, if we confront a methodological objection that is often pressed
against this text. The worry has to do with Kant’s appeal to geometry in
the Transcendental Exposition.34 When Kant contrasts the ‘synthetic’
method of the Critique with the ‘analytic’ method of the Prolegomena,
he glosses the distinction by insisting that the Critique is ‘robbed of all
help from other sciences’ (4: 275), and ‘lays nothing as given for its basis
except reason itself’ (4: 274). By contrast, the Prolegomena assumes the
actuality of certain bodies of synthetic a priori cognition, and argues
regressively to the conditions of their possibility. The worry is that the
Transcendental Exposition starts to look a lot like the regressive argu-
ment of the first part of the Prolegomena.35
I do not think that this methodological worry about the Transcen-
dental Exposition is tangential to the concerns of this paper, although it
will take a little time to bring out its relevance to our task here: namely,
to gain a clearer view of the philosophical resources of the Transcen-
dental Aesthetic in order to come to terms with Kant’s retrospective
identification of a transcendental deduction of the concepts of space
and time. In order to work through the relevant issues, we must begin by
taking a closer look at the argument of the Transcendental Exposition.
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Kant draws two inferences in the Transcendental Exposition. The
first stems from geometry’s status as a body of synthetic a priori claims;
since this cognition of the determinacy of space does not proceed from
the analysis of concepts alone, it relies upon some intuition (space). The
second inference proceeds from the fact that geometry’s propositions are
‘one and all apodictic, i.e. bound up with the consciousness of their
necessity’ (B41); from this Kant seems to infer that space must be a pure
intuition. Here Kant appears to draw the following inference: since
geometry yields only apodictic cognition, therefore the object of this
cognition – space itself – must be a pure, rather than an empirical,
intuition.
This second inference looks problematic, as it would seem to meet
with a counterexample in the case of ‘pure natural science’ – a science
which Kant takes to be apodictic. If pure natural science is concerned
with nature, then it would seem to pertain to what can only be given in
experience, i.e. empirically. Thus we seem to have a counterexample
blocking Kant’s inference from the apodictic status of geometry to the
conclusion that its object (space) must be given a priori (i.e. be pure
intuition). In order to address this issue, we will need to consider briefly
Kant’s conception of pure natural science, and how it differs from
empirical (or experimental) natural science.
Pure natural science is not directly concerned with material nature –
i.e. the actuality of nature given in sense experience. If pure natural
science has an object, it is the very idea of ‘a nature in general’ (B165).
This idea of a nature in general is articulated in terms of the battery of
synthetic a priori propositions that Kant calls the principles of pure
understanding; these principles express ‘the conformity to law of
appearances in space and time’ (B165). These are the principles by which
nature, as the sum total of appearances, can be determined a priori to
a certain formal unity – i.e. possible experience. Pure natural science
does not yield cognitive claims about the actuality of material nature.
Experimental natural science offers cognitive claims about the actuality
of material nature. And while it posits laws of nature – propositions that
purport to express what necessarily happens, rather than what seems to
happen for the most part – these laws are contingent in the following
sense. The principles of pure natural science might have been realized in
a world that had a different concrete actuality: they could have been
realized in a world without electrons, osmosis, or gravitational attrac-
tion. This is a point that Kant reinforces in the Critique of Judgement’s
Introduction: the principles of pure understanding leave much undeter-
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mined in empirical laws of nature.36 There are certain contingent facts
about the world in which we find ourselves. These facts figure in the
content of these empirical laws; this is what is left undetermined by the
principles of the pure understanding.
But how does this bear on the Transcendental Exposition of space?
Ultimately, it teaches us how to appreciate Kant’s appeal to geometry; it
does this by indicating why Kant’s inference – from the apodictic status
of cognition to the a priori status of its object – may be legitimate after
all. Although laws of nature are posited in experimental natural science,
this does not entail that there might not have been other empirical laws.
Therefore, the claims of empirical natural science are not apodictic in
the strict sense: they are not ‘bound up with the consciousness of their
necessity’. However, suppose that we accept Kant’s arguments in the
Critique’s Transcendental Analytic. It would follow that the proposi-
tions of pure natural science – spelled out as the battery of principles of
the pure understanding – are apodictic: in so far as we recognize these
principles at all, we in turn recognize their necessity. That apodictic
cognition is transcendental cognition concerned with the essential char-
acter of our cognitive capacity. By these lights, then, mathematics offers
apodictic cognition because it pertains to the nature of representations
fundamental to our cognitive capacity, and does not pertain directly to
the material actuality of nature.
With this, we can return to the methodological problem noted above.
The Transcendental Exposition’s appeal to geometry is legitimate, I am
suggesting, if it simply appeals to the point that geometry concerns the
a priori determinacy of the representation of space. For the particular
determinacy of space is established without regard to the material
actuality of nature. As Kant explains later on in the Aesthetic, if the
intuition on which one had to ‘rely’ in order to recognize that two
straight lines cannot enclose a space were empirical, then the resulting
proposition would not be universally valid and apodictic as we know
the claims of geometry to be (A47–8/B64–5). Empirical intuition involves
sensation; it is therefore dependent, at least in part, on the actuality of
material nature. For Kant, then, the apodictic status of geometry’s
claims can be accounted for only if space is pure intuition. Hence Kant
may conclude that ‘our explanation’ of the concept of space – the one
provided in the Metaphysical Exposition – ‘alone makes the possibility
of geometry . . . comprehensible’ (B41). Space must really exist as a
pure intuition.
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What I mean to suggest, then, is that the Transcendental Exposition
invokes geometry merely as a science of space – and not as a science of
nature. If this is correct, then the Transcendental Exposition does not
flout the methodological restriction on the Critique for the following
reason: the Critique cannot draw upon any science of material nature,
for then its claims would not be apodictic in the strict sense that Kant
invokes in the Transcendental Exposition. Geometry is apodictic (its
claims are ‘bound up with the consciousness of their necessity’) and any
apodictic discipline is, I am suggesting, fundamentally a study of the
nature of reason itself. Thus Kant may invoke geometry without thereby
drawing on something other than ‘reason itself’.37
Of course, Kant’s considered view is that mathematics is a science of
nature: later, he remarks that mathematics does not yield cognition
except insofar as it is applicable to appearances (§22, B146–8). But this
only shows that, for Kant, the mere idea of a mathematical science does
not – by itself – entail anything about cognition of material nature. The
Transcendental Exposition lies well upstream of any account of the
necessary applicability of mathematics to appearances; only this could
show mathematics to be a science of nature. Geometry may be admitted
as given at the outset of the Transcendental Exposition – but merely as
a science of space, and not as a science of nature. Hence the apodictic
status of geometry can be drawn upon independently of the question
about geometry’s application to appearances. For the purposes of
the Transcendental Exposition, geometry is concerned merely with the
necessary determinations of space as pure intuition, a mode of repre-
senting.
Let me recapitulate the main points of my interpretation of the
Transcendental Aesthetic’s project of exposition. ‘Exposition’ refers to
the presentation of the content of a concept. The task of the Meta-
physical Exposition is concept analysis. The Metaphysical Expositions
simply reveal our commitment to the idea that space and time are pure
intuitions. They cannot establish that we are right to think of space and
time in this way: after all, Kant recognizes that many natural philo-
sophers get along with inadequate conceptions of space and time
(A39–41/B56–58). The Transcendental Expositions show the concepts of
space and time (as exposited in the Metaphysical Expositions) to be
legitimate, by establishing the reality of their referent. This furthers the
task of ‘exposition’ (i.e. presenting what belongs to a given concept),
because we recognize something further about the concept: the pure
intuition to which it refers is also a source of synthetic a priori cognition.
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This is a ‘synthetic’ exposition because the claim in question draws upon
the recognition this pure intuition really exists, as an element of our
representational makeup.
The transcendental deduction of the concepts of space and time is
made explicit in the sections of commentary that follow the Expositions.
Kant’s express task in those sections is to show that our view of the
reality of space and time must be appreciated within the context of tran-
scendental idealism. Where, in this commentary, is the transcendental
deduction of the concepts of space and time? I shall consider those
issues now.
6.
Nowhere in the text of the Aesthetic itself does Kant refer to any
‘transcendental deduction’ of ‘the concepts of space and time’; he
mentions it only later, in the run-up to the Transcendental Deduction of
the categories (§13, A87/B119–20). This deduction is supposed to have
‘traced’ these concepts ‘to their sources’ and ‘explained and determined
their a priori objective validity’ (A87/B119–20). A transcendental deduc-
tion is an account of the objective validity of an a priori concept. On the
basis of my account, it may seem that the Transcendental Expositions
provide that transcendental deduction. For I argued that while the
Metaphysical Expositions reveal our commitment to the idea that space
and time are pure intuitions, the Transcendental Expositions show that
there really are such pure intuitions (to which the concepts of space and
time refer). But as I mentioned above, Kant addresses the legitimacy of
the concepts of space and time separately from their objective validity.
For it is one thing to establish that, say, space really exists as a pure
intuition (and therefore the account of the concept of space in the Meta-
physical Exposition must be endorsed), and something else to account
for the necessary universal applicability of the concept of space to
external objects. The Transcendental Exposition addresses the legiti-
macy of these concepts, whereas the transcendental deduction addresses
their a priori objective validity.
In the Prolegomena, Kant discusses the task of a transcendental
deduction of space and time in just these terms. The transcendental
deduction, Kant explains, promises to remove the following threat:
namely, that the concept of space, and hence mathematics itself, would
have no necessary application to appearances (4: 287, 292). This deduc-
tion should show ‘the space of the geometer’ to be no ‘mere invention’
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that one ‘would credit with no objective validity’ (4: 287). Without this
transcendental deduction, the claims of mathematics could very well be
‘determinations of a mere creation of our poetic imagination, and thus
could not reliably be related to actual objects’ (4: 287). So, while the
Transcendental Exposition establishes that there really exists something
to which the concept of space, as exposited in the Metaphysical Exposi-
tion, refers – namely space as a pure intuition – it does not explicitly
address the applicability of the concept of space to objects in the world
outside of us.38
The transcendental deduction of the concepts of space and time
makes explicit the upshot of the expositions of space and time: it is their
direct consequence. The expositions show that the concepts of space
and time legitimately refer to pure intuitions of space and time. And
since space and time are pure intuitions constitutive of our receptivity,
the concepts of space and time – simply by referring to these pure intui-
tions – are necessarily valid of all appearances. Hence these concepts are
necessarily applicable to any possible object of experience. This simple
inference is the transcendental deduction of the concepts of space and
time. But the significance of this transcendental deduction can be
appreciated only in light of the broader aims of the Critique.
7.
According to Kant, we are in no position to appreciate the need for a
transcendental deduction of the concept of space (he does not mention
time) until we face the problem of establishing the objective validity
of the categories. For the discovery of categories, Kant maintains,
engenders a certain confusion about the concept of space that makes its
transcendental deduction as imperative as any.
Yet with the pure concepts of the understanding [i.e. the categories] begins
the unavoidable requirement to seek a transcendental deduction not only of
them, but also of space; for . . . these [pure] concepts [of the understanding]
. . . refer to objects universally, apart from all conditions of sensibility. And,
since they are not grounded on experience . . . they arouse suspicion on
account of the objective validity and limits of their employment, but they
also make the concept of space ambiguous, for they have a tendency to use it
even beyond the conditions of sensible intuition, on account of which a
transcendental deduction of it was also needed above. (A88/B120–1)
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The categories are concepts that purport to stem from the nature of the
intellect alone; at the same time, they purport to be applicable to objects
a priori. The battery of such concepts, Kant here suggests, presents at
least the idea of an intelligible world – a world determinable by these
concepts alone. Once such a world is invoked, we soon find ourselves
thinking, for example, of causal interactions between substances in such
a world. But we find that we cannot help but to think of these substances
interacting from various locations in space; so if we take ourselves to be
able to make cognitive determinations about the objects of such a world,
then we inevitably involve the concept of space. This renders ‘the con-
cept of space ambiguous’, since we are involving it in claims about
intelligibilia, when it rightfully pertains only to sensibilia.
The inevitability just pointed to stems from a contingent fact about
us: that human sensibility is constituted by space and time. In this
respect, the intuitions of space and time have a crucially different status,
in Kant’s system, from the categories. Since the categories are derived
from functions of judgement presented by pure general logic, Kant
supposes that any discursive understanding is constituted by such con-
cepts: for there are simply no other functions that preserve the coherence
of thought, and hence there can be no other concepts that could be
constitutive of an understanding. With the invocation of such concepts
comes the idea of an intelligible world – an idea that is presumptive and
fraudulent as soon as it is treated as anything more than a mere idea.
We can see, then, that two distinct points emerge from the Exposi-
tions, both resting on the single idea that space and time are constitutive
of our sensibility. One is the transcendental deduction, sensu stricto:
because these concepts refer to pure intuitions that are constitutive of
our sensibility, it follows that these concepts are necessarily applicable to
all appearances that could figure in any possible cognition. The second
point specially accommodates the point that space and time are consti-
tutive of our sensibility: the concepts that refer to these pure intuitions
are applicable only to appearances.
We can also now appreciate the apodictic result that the Aesthetic is
supposed to provide for the subsequent arguments of the Critique: it is
supposed to clarify the concepts of space and time so that they will no
longer be employed in an ‘ambiguous’ manner. This, in turn, is sup-
posed to establish a necessary limitation on the employment of the
categories. For unlike the categories, Kant explains, the concepts of
space and time ‘determine their own bounds’ (A39/B56). They are self-
limiting simply because they refer to the intuitions of space and time:
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intuition is the mode of representation that expresses the receptivity of
sensibility. The concepts of space and time are like the categories in
being pure, and not empirical; but they are importantly unlike the
categories in that the presentation of these concepts does not invoke any
notion of a noumenal world. We appreciate that point only through the
exposition of these concepts, which establishes that they refer to pure
intuitions.
I have delayed directing our attention to the passages that actually
contain the transcendental deduction of the concepts of space and time.
This is because we can hardly make out this transcendental deduction
until we appreciate why it is required; and our appreciation of why this
transcendental deduction is required can only be rendered vivid when
the perennial threat of dogmatic metaphysics is appreciated in light of
the categories’ status as concepts that stem from the ‘nature of the
understanding alone’. Hence Kant’s merely retrospective identification
of the transcendental deduction of the concepts of space and time, in
the preamble to the transcendental deduction of the categories (§13). We
can now turn to the passage that contains the transcendental deduction
of the concept of space:
Because we cannot make the particular conditions of sensibility into con-
ditions of the possibility of things, but rather only of their appearances, we
can indeed say that space encompasses all things that may appear to us
externally, but not all things in themselves, be they intuited or not, or by
whatever subject they may be intuited . . . If we add the limitation of a judge-
ment to the subject concept, then the judgement is unconditionally valid. The
proposition, ‘all things are next to one another in space’, is valid under the
limitation: if these things are taken to be objects of our sensible intuition. If
I add here the condition to the concept and say: ‘all things, as outer appear-
ances, are next to one another in space’, then this rule is valid universally and
without limitation. (A27/B43)39
The passage captures both the transcendental deduction itself, and its
significance for Kant’s reconception of metaphysics within the frame-
work of transcendental idealism. The concept of space is necessarily
applicable to all outer appearances that could figure in any possible
cognition. And yet, our account of the universal objective validity of the
concept of space cannot abstract from the ‘human standpoint’ (A26/
B42). Thus we are reminded that the concept of space is applicable only
to outer appearances.
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The Aesthetic’s transcendental deduction provides only a minimal
account of how the concepts of space and time must be valid of objects
a priori: namely because these concepts refer to pure intuitions that
are constitutive of our sensibility. Despite this minimal account, the
Aesthetic yields a result for the transcendental deduction of the cate-
gories. That result is the transcendental deduction of the concepts of
space and time, which explains that these concepts are self-limiting.
Since these concepts refer to pure intuitions, and these pure intuitions
are actualizations of our receptive capacity, these concepts necessarily
apply to any object of reason’s theoretical cognition. In this way, the
Aesthetic introduces a necessary limitation on any valid employment of
the categories – a result that proves crucial for the subsequent vindi-
cation of the claim of reason, at least as Kant conceived of it.40
Notes
1 In this paper, I use the terms ‘cognition’ and ‘knowledge’ interchangeably –
although I usually translate Kant’s Erkenntnis with ‘cognition’. References
to Kant’s works, with the exception of the Critique of Pure Reason, refer to
the volume and page of the German Academy of Sciences edition (Gesam-
melte Schriften, ed. Königliche Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften,
later the Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. 29 volumes.
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter [and predecessors], 1902–.) References to the
Critique of Pure Reason are cited according to the pagination of the first (A)
and second (B) editions. Translations are my own (unless otherwise noted),
but I consult the commonly used English translations.
2 This characterization of the categories draws from Kant’s account of the
difference between intellectual, empirical, and arbitrary concepts in the
Jäsche Logic (9: 94).
3 Titles of any section of the Critique are given, often in abbreviated form,
with the standard capitalization for titles; without such capitalization, the
phrase instead refers to the general sort of argument or account in question.
For example, Kant’s reference to a ‘transcendental deduction of the concepts
of space and time’ refers to no titled section of the book, and receives no
capitals; the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Under-
standing does.
4 Commentators tend to pass over Kant’s remark about a transcendental
deduction of space and time altogether; those who do address it tend to do
so obliquely, or in footnotes – under the radar, as it were. And we find a wide
range of views on the matter. Lorne Falkenstein says that this deduction is
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to be found in the Transcendental Aesthetic’s Metaphysical Expositions of
space and time; see Kant’s Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcen-
dental Aesthetic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), pp. 394–5,
n. 12. Daniel Warren is non-committal: he first implies that this deduction
would be found in the Transcendental Aesthetic’s Transcendental Exposi-
tions of space and time which follow the Metaphysical Expositions, main-
taining that the objective validity of space and time cannot be addressed
until after the Metaphysical Expositions; see ‘Kant and the Apriority
of Space’, Philosophical Review, 107 (1998), 179–224, p. 222, n. 57 and
pp. 222–4. But in the final sentence of his paper, he seems to imply that this
deduction might instead be achieved through the Transcendental Deduction
of the categories (p. 224). Sadik Al-Azm hints that the transcendental
deduction of space and time requires the ‘synthetic approach’ of the Tran-
scendental Deduction of the categories, and not the ‘analytical’ approach of
the Aesthetic: ‘In this [synthetic approach] lies their transcendental justifica-
tion’; see Kant’s Theory of Time (New York: Philosophical Library, 1967),
p. 35.
5 Karl Ameriks supposes that the transcendental deduction of space and time
is the Aesthetic’s Transcendental Exposition, and then goes on to treat
Kant’s remarks about ‘transcendental exposition’ as a guide to understand-
ing the transcendental deduction of the categories; see ‘Kant’s Transcen-
dental Deduction as a Regressive Argument’, Kant Studien, 19 (1978), 273–
87, pp. 274ff.
6 It is to be expected of a project as systematically driven as the Critique that
our grasp of one part of the book should depend upon our grasp of another.
Indeed, in so far as the Critique is truly a system, we should expect this to
work in more than one direction: not only should an earlier part of the book
provide a result that allows for a later argument to go through, at the same
time the result of a later argument could mandate a return to an earlier part
of the book so that we may see it in a newly corrected light. Much of the
recent work on the relation between the Aesthetic and the Deduction is
retrospective in this way, arguing that the Deduction reveals the Aesthetic to
be a provisional text. See Béatrice Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to
Judge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), esp. chapter 8; Wayne
Waxman, Kant’s Model of the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1991), esp. chapter 2; and, looking further back, Sadik Al-Azm, Kant’s
Theory of Time, part II. For an example of recent commentary resisting this
trend, see Lorne Falkenstein, Kant’s Intuitionism, especially chapters 1 and
2.
The view of the Aesthetic as a provisional text is typically adopted on the
basis of the Deduction’s concluding argument regarding a spontaneous
capacity of the mind ‘to determine sensibility a priori’ (§24 B152; cf. §26
B160n.) – a capacity expressed in what Kant refers to as ‘figurative syn-
thesis’. As Longuenesse argues, the Aesthetic is provisional because Kant
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ultimately ‘wants to reveal in these forms [of intuition, i.e. space and time]
the manifestation of an activity that only the Transcendental Deduction of
the Categories can make explicit’ (Kant and the Capacity to Judge, pp. 211
and 213). In other words, the Aesthetic had to talk about things that it lacked
the resources to account for; hence a ‘retrospective clarification’ of the
Aesthetic is in order once those resources are in hand (Kant and the Capacity
to Judge, p. 217; see also Waxman, Kant’s Model of the Mind, p. 80).
7 Could the Critique have been organized differently, so that the account of
sensibility followed the account of the understanding? Kant addresses this
question, briefly, in an unsent draft of a letter to J. H. Tieftrunk. There he
says only that the order of exposition actually found in the Critique is
certainly more ‘natural’ (13: 463), but does not maintain that it is required.
But in the Critique itself, Kant suggests that the order of exposition – the
Aesthetic first – is indeed required (A16/B30; see also Critique of Practical
Reason, 5: 89–90).
8 By ‘hylomorphism thesis’, I refer to Kant’s claim that a distinction can be
drawn between the ‘matter’ and ‘form’ of intuition. In the Aesthetic, Kant
goes on to explain their relation in the following way. Matter is dependent
upon form: sensation cannot figure as matter for empirical intuition apart
from the formal (spatio-temporal) conditions identified in the Aesthetic. Yet
form is independent of matter, inasmuch as we can represent ‘pure space’
and ‘pure time’ at all.
9 This may be the place to mention an interpretative strategy of Lorne
Falkenstein, who generally aims to take the Aesthetic on its own terms –
resisting the trend to read the Aesthetic as a provisional text in light of the
Transcendental Deduction’s doctrine of figurative synthesis (on this general
issue, see note 6 above; in Falkenstein’s text see, e.g. p. 383, n. 31). Despite
this, Falkenstein is prone to read the Critique backwards, relying on later
developments in order to fill the gaps of the arguments he sees Kant as
making (or needing to make) in the Aesthetic. For example, Falkenstein
remarks that, at the end of the Aesthetic’s Metaphysical Expositions, Kant
has not yet ‘presented an argument that could demonstrate that space and
time could not have originated from any sort of intellectual process what-
soever’ – instead he has only shown that ‘certain intellectual processes are
inadequate to do this job’ (p. 242). In order to fill the gaps of what he takes
to be Kant’s argument, Falkenstein points to the Transcendental Analytic’s
putatively complete table of four types of synthesis (pp. 242–3); he then
argues that ‘none of these four . . . types of synthesis could plausibly be
supposed to originally generate a representation of space or time out of
intuitions that are originally aspatiotemporal’ (p. 243). Whatever the
philosophical insight of Falkenstein’s account, it is distracting if our aim is
to interpret the Aesthetic in a manner that is consonant with its own philo-
sophical resources. (For another passage that raises similar concerns, see
Kant’s Intuitionism, p. 73.)
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10 Practical cognition does not merely determine its object, but also makes it
actual (Bix–x).
11 The division into ‘metaphysical’ and ‘transcendental’ exposition is made
explicit only in the second edition. I will be dealing with the second-edition
text.
12 See e.g. Henry Allison,Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, revised and enlarged
edition (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004), pp. 465–6,
n. 5).
13 Kant, Falkenstein remarks, ‘needs simply to prove that our concepts of space
and time are concepts of the form of intuition rather than the matter of
intuition, of the objects of appearance, or of the functions of intellectual
synthesis. As a matter of fact, this is what Kant does’ (Kant’s Intuitionism,
p. 150).
14 I dispute the details of Falkenstein’s account on methodological grounds
especially (see note 9 above).
15 As space and time are presented as concepts that admit of such exposition,
they are, presumably, concepts that are ‘given a priori’. In the Jäsche Logic,
Kant distinguishes between ‘given’ and ‘made’ concepts: the content of given
concepts is revealed analytically, while the content of made concepts is
established synthetically. Kant also refers to the ‘exposition (of appear-
ances)’ as the explanation of the content of concepts made from empirical
synthesis (§102, 9: 141).
16 On definition, and why philosophy cannot offer definition in the strict sense
(while mathematics can) see A730/B758; and Jäsche Logic §§100–102, 9: 141.
See also Kant’s caveat that we should not expect to find definitions in the
Critique: the work must provide a ‘complete enumeration of the funda-
mental concepts which comprise the pure cognition under consideration’,
but it will not provide a ‘complete analysis of these concepts’ (A13/B27).
17 The Jäsche Logic uses the German Erörterung, whereas the Doctrine of
Method uses the Latinate Exposition. However, the Jäsche Logic glosses
Erörterungwith the Latin exposition (9: 142), suggesting that remarks about
exposition (Exposition) in the Doctrine of Method offer interpretative
guidance regarding the expositions (Erörterungen) of space and time in the
Aesthetic.
18 Here I am employing a somewhat limited notion of conceptual content – a
notion of content that abstracts from questions about cognitive significance.
In this respect, we can speak of the content of the concept phlogiston, even
if this concept is not objectively valid or has no genuine cognitive signifi-
cance. On this limited conception, the content of a concept can brought out
by reflecting upon our usage of the concept, and taking note of the relevant
entailment relations; it is still a further question to consider whether
the concept in question has genuine cognitive significance or objective
validity. A cognitively void concept could, in this restricted sense, still have
content.
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19 Since the Transcendental Expositions address an existence claim – namely
that the concepts of space and time, as exposited in the Metaphysical
Expositions, have a real referent – they can be thought of as the ‘synthetic’
complement to the mere concept analysis of the Metaphysical Expositions.
While most commentators treat the Transcendental Expositions as an
analytic ‘argument from geometry’, Lisa Shabel argues that this is mistaken;
see ‘Kant’s “Argument from Geometry”’, Journal of the History of Philo-
sophy, 42 (2004), 195–215. Her view of the synthetic burden of the Tran-
scendental Exposition differs significantly from my own, however. I assess
this in note 33 below.
20 See note 9 above.
21 Warren, ‘Kant and the Apriority of Space’, §5.
22 Warren himself does not make much of the idea that the Metaphysical
Expositions are concept analysis, and he remains somewhat non-committal
about the repeated references to the concepts of space and time in the
Aesthetic (‘Kant and the Apriority of Space’, pp. 219–20, n. 52).
23 From a methodological perspective, the reconstructive approach that
commentators have taken toward the Metaphysical Expositions is often
problematic. Warren, for example, reconstructs only what he takes to be the
‘first apriority argument’; this leaves us wondering about its role in the
account as a whole – how does it relate to the other three ‘a priority argu-
ments’ that Warren suggests should be found in the Metaphysical Exposi-
tion? Why do we need four apriority arguments – is one not sufficient?
24 Many commentators follow Henry Allison in seeing the division of labour
in the Metaphysical Exposition in the following way: the first two moments
provide two distinct arguments in favor of the apriority of the representation
of space, while the second two moments provide two distinct arguments in
favor of claim that space is an intuition rather than a concept (see Kant’s
Transcendental Idealism, pp. 99–112; for a recent endorsement of this view,
see Shabel, ‘Kant’s “Argument from Geometry”’, pp. 198–9). The moments
do indeed seem to come in pairs, with the first pair arguably emphasizing the
apriority theme, and the second pair arguably emphasizing the intuitionality
theme. Nevertheless, emphasizing one issue over the other is not the same as
disentangling the two and treating each in isolation from the other, so that
distinct arguments for the apriority and intuition theses are advanced (or
supplied by commentators). Take, for example, the second moment: even
though it arguably emphasizes the apriority issue, it still has the intuition
issue in play. For there Kant says that space is not to be regarded ‘as a deter-
mination dependent upon appearances’ (A24/B39). Inasmuch as the notion
of ‘determination’ (Bestimmung) is generally associated with theories of
judgement and hence with concepts, Kant seems to be working toward the
claim that space is not a concept at the same time that he is working toward
the claim that space is a priori.
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At any rate, I am advocating a more holistic treatment of the Meta-
physical Exposition than is standard. I have come to this interpretative
position in large part because the text does not bear out the standard
interpretative claim that there are four distinct, but interrelated, arguments.
We find a far better characterization of what is actually there on the page
of the Metaphysical Exposition in Kant’s remarks regarding the analytic
exposition of given concepts. In the Critique, he emphasizes that such
exposition is merely ‘valid to a certain degree’ (A729/B757). And in the pre-
Critical Prize Essay, Kant says that analytic exposition merely brings out
what we ‘notice’ about the content of the concept – where these claims may
be ‘elucidated’ but ‘can never be proven’ (2: 281). The Metaphysical Exposi-
tion better resembles a collective set of remarks offering gradual clarification
and elucidation of the content of the concept of space, than it does a set of
four apodictic demonstrations.
25 Speaking roughly, we might say that one rhapsodic blotch is ‘bigger than’
another, or ‘to the left of’ another, or even positioned at a certain relative
distance from another (e.g. ‘blotch a stands at a distance of half the width
of blotch a to blotch b’). But to be precise we should not refer to these as
spatial properties, but rather as properties analogous to spatial properties;
this is because rhapsodic blotches are not in space at all.
26 My interpretation here does not draw upon anything other than the funda-
mental distinction Kant draws between intuition and concept as modes of
representation; this distinction is already in place from the beginning of the
Aesthetic (§1 A19/B33).
27 A judgement is a representation (‘the representation of a representation’,
A68/B93).
28 The fourth moment turns on the point that we cannot conceive of a
concept’s containing an ‘infinite multitude’ of concepts within its intension.
But this is not a self-evident claim, even though Kant treats it as one. For
it is not hard to imagine a theory of concepts that would not find any
incoherence in this idea. Such a theory might say of the concept book that
the predicate is not a member of parliament belongs to its intension; and so
does the predicate is not the number 2, along with much else. Such a theory
could countenance the possibility of a concept’s containing infinitely many
representations within its intension. Kant, however, seems to be considering
the nature of concepts, at least with respect to their intension, quite
differently. He is evidently supposing that certain considerations of relevance
factor into what we can plausibly take the intension of a concept to be – a
great many negative predicates will simply not be relevant. Unfortunately,
Kant does not argue the point; and the incoherence of a concept’s containing
infinitely many predicates in its intension is not self-evident.
29 In §26 of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant says that it is through figura-
tive synthesis that ‘all concepts of space and time first become possible’
(B161n.). Kant’s remark indicates that we should not expect the Aesthetic to
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provide an account of howwe acquire the concepts of space and time, since
such an account would need to draw upon resources that presumably only
become available in the Deduction. Cf. ‘Über eine Entdeckung’ (8: 221–3),
where Kant indicates that not only are the categories ‘originally acquired’
but also the pure intuitions of space and time. The issue of original acqui-
sition is central to Waxman, Kant’s Model of the Mind (pp. 44–7, and
chapter 3), and also figures prominently in Longuenesse, Kant and the
Capacity to Judge (chapter 8, esp. p. 222; and pp. 252ff.).
30 Some clarification of this claim that the concept of space refers to ‘all of the
following: a pure intuition, a unique particular, and a mode of representing’
is in order, as an anonymous referee has suggested. It makes sense to say that
(e.g.) there are distances between various conceivable points in space if we
take space to be either a pure intuition or a unique particular. But is it not
rather strained to suppose that there are distances between various con-
ceivable points in space considered as ‘a certain capacity for representing’ or
a ‘mode of representing’? However, there is no need to attribute distances
between various conceivable points to the capacity for a priori intuition.
Rather, there would only be such distances in any representation of space,
i.e. in any representation that results from the exercise of this capacity. The
capacity in question is constitutionally connected to the representation of
space as pure intuition. More generally, saying that the concept of space
refers to a capacity for intuition entails that spatial properties apply to things
as they are represented through the exercise of this capacity.
31 Kant does not refer to an account of the ‘legitimacy’ of these concepts – that
is my term; but he does, of course, refer to the account of their objective
validity, through their transcendental deduction. The account of the legiti-
macy of the concepts of space and time differs from the account of their
objective validity in the following way: the account of their legitimacy just
shows that these concepts have a real referent (space and time as pure intui-
tions), while the account of their objective validity addresses their necessary
applicability to objects that can only be given in experience. For more on
this, see §§6–7 below.
32 The importance of this point will be brought out below.
33 In denying that the Transcendental Exposition offers a regressive ‘argument
from geometry’, Shabel suggests that its task is ‘synthetic’ (see pp. 195–6 and
passim). Although I agree that the argumentative burden of the Transcen-
dental Exposition is ‘synthetic’, I find serious problems with her account.
Shabel explains the relation between the Metaphysical Exposition and
the Transcendental Exposition in the following way: the Metaphysical
Exposition issues a ‘background claim that space is a pure intuition’, leading
Kant to ask, in the Transcendental Exposition, ‘how does our representation
of space manage to afford us those cognitions that are the unique domain of
the science of geometry? His question is not whether it does so, but how’
(p. 203). While I acknowledge that Kant’s overarching question in the
KANT ON THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF SPACE AND TIME
KANTIAN REVIEW, VOLUME 14-2, 2010 35
Kantian 14-2 pages:Master Testpages KR  4/1/10  12:54  Page 35
Critique is of the latter sort, it must be recognized that the Transcendental
Aesthetic does not possess the explanatory resources to provide any account
of how synthetic a priori judging is possible, or even how some particular
species of it is possible (e.g. geometry). In the Critique, Kant proceeds with
the general question about the possibility of synthetic a priori judging
(B19–22); he does not attempt to address – piecemeal – separate questions
about the possibility of pure mathematics, of pure natural science, and of
metaphysics (as he does in the Prolegomena). The general question about the
possibility of synthetic a priori cognition, or judging, only begins to be
addressed in the Transcendental Deduction, since the account of its possi-
bility rests on the establishment of the principle of the synthetic unity of
apperception. In short: the Aesthetic’s Transcendental Exposition does not
possess the explanatory resources to address the question that Shabel attri-
butes to it – i.e. a question about how the science of geometry is possible.
Moreover, Shabel does not give adequate attention to the difference in
modality between the conclusions of the Metaphysical Exposition versus the
Transcendental Exposition. On Shabel’s view, Kant ‘takes himself already to
have shown that space is a pure intuition’ in the Metaphysical Exposition
(p. 202) – she sees this as a concrete result on which Kant then builds a
‘philosophical bridge . . . to his transcendental idealism’ (p. 196), with Kant’s
philosophy of mathematics serving as the relevant bridge. However, we
should consider the contrast between the Metaphysical Exposition’s claim
that ‘the original representation of space is a priori intuition’ (B40, my
emphasis on the copula), and the Transcendental Exposition claims that
space ‘must originally be intuition’ (B41). On my reading, this difference can
be explained: the Metaphysical Exposition is analytic, laying bare merely
what we actually think in a given concept, whereas the Transcendental
Exposition is synthetic, showing that there really is something to which this
concept refers – space as pure intuition. The Transcendental Exposition
shows that spacemust really be as exposited in the Metaphysical Exposition.
34 The Transcendental Exposition of time relies, in a similar fashion, on what
Kant refers to as the ‘general theory of motion [allgemeine Bewegungslehre]’
(B49). Kant makes a point here of not invoking the empirical concept of
matter, conceiving of alteration and motion in the abstract (B48).
35 Kant’s appeal to geometry in the Transcendental Exposition is all the more
striking, given that it is arguably emphasized in the second edition (1787)
version, which appeared after these remarks on the Critique’s methodology
in the 1783 Prolegomena. For it is only in the second edition version that
Kant explicitly divides the exposition into ‘metaphysical’ and ‘transcen-
dental’ phases; simply marking that division would, it seems, draw extra
attention to the Transcendental Exposition’s appeal to geometry. (In the first
edition, a version of the second edition’s Transcendental Exposition is
sandwiched in between what later became the second and third moments of
the exposition of space; see A24.)
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36 Critique of Judgement, Introduction §IV (5:180); see also Critique of Pure
Reason §26 (B165).
37 This interpretation of the methodological stricture might also account for
the Critique’s reliance on pure general logic in the presentation of the table
of categories (A70–83/B95–109). While it lies well beyond the bounds of this
paper to examine the role of pure general logic in the argument of the
Critique, it might prove instructive to acknowledge that the same method-
ological difficulty seems to arise there, too. And the resolution of the
apparent methodological difficulty would run along parallel lines: just as
geometry is a science of space, concerned with the ‘sensible’ faculty of pure
general reason, so pure general logic is concerned with the ‘intellectual’
faculty of pure general reason. Kant can appeal to both, without flouting the
restriction to take nothing as given except reason itself. (Presumably, the
same point could be made with regard to the Transcendental Exposition of
time’s appeal to the ‘general theory of motion’ (B49), as well.)
38 In this passage from the Prolegomena, Kant runs together two issues that are
kept distinct in the Critique. In the Transcendental Aesthetic’s deduction of
the concept of space, Kant draws the inference that the concept of space
is necessarily applicable to objects of our cognition. The problem of the
necessary applicability of mathematics to appearances is a different (but
related) issue. For the former addresses the applicability of a concept to
appearances, while the latter addresses the applicability of a body of
cognition to appearances. The account of how mathematics is necessarily
applicable to appearances depends upon the result of the transcendental
deduction of the categories; in the Critique, this account is provided only
later, in the Analytic of Principles – it is the point of the Axioms of Intuition
and the Anticipations of Perception.
39 For the parallel passage regarding the concept of time, see A34–5/B51–2.
40 I am grateful to two anonymous referees for this journal, whose comments
and criticisms greatly improved this paper. Thanks to Sasha Newton and
Sebastian Rand for comments on an earlier version of this paper. Special
thanks are due, as ever, to Markos Valaris for much discussion and for
helpful comments throughout.
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